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NINTH UPDATE TO COLORADO WATER LAW:
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
THE HONORABLE GREGORYJ. HOBBS, JR.
To provide our readers with the most up-to-date water law information,
the editors periodically include updates of works previously published in the
Water Law Review. The following is the ninth update to Colorado Water
Law: An Histoica Oveiview, Appendix-Colorado Waer Law: A Synopsi.s of
Statutes and CLse Law,' selected by the Honorable Gregoryj. Hobbs, Jr. '

Reynolds v. Cotten
"If, as the plaintiff-ditch owners assert, and the language of the 1952 and
1960 decrees appears to support, their appropriative rights with regard to nondrain native water were merely subordinated to those of River Ranch, the W3894 court's reference to their non-imported supply of water as drain water
simply reflects the fact that historically the full amount of their appropriative
right had not exceeded the water flowing into La Jara Creek from the Drain.
As the water court itself appeared to recognize, in the absence of any indication that the W-3894 judgment was intended as a declaration of all rights on
the stream, this language of the judgment would simply be understood as a
quantification of the appropriative right of the Reeds, any or all of which could
be satisfied from the Drain ahead of either River Ranch or any of the other
plaintiff-ditch owners. It would suggest nothing, however, about the rights or
priorities of the Reeds to non-drain native water, in the event their full appropriation could not be completely satisfied from the Drain.
Because the matter that was explicitly determined by the W-3894 judgment-the amount of water from the Drain for which the Reeds were senior to
River Ranch-can be rationally understood without necessarily implying a determination of the asserted issue-whether the plaintiff-ditch owners appropriative rights in LaJara Creek were merely subordinated by the 1952 and 1960
decrees to River Ranch's rights to non-drain native water rather than altogether extinguished-the ditch owners cannot be collaterally estopped from litigating that issue in the current proceedings."

1. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Coloado 14acr Law: An Hjiorical Ovcneies 1 U. Drv.
WATER L. REv. 1, 27 (1997). The first update to justice Hobbs's article appears at 2 U. DrNv.
WATER L. REv. 223 (1999); the second update is at 4 U. DNV. WATER L. REv. 111 (2000);
the third update is at 6 U. DENY. WATER L. REv. 116 (2002); the fourth update is at 8
U. DrFN'v. WATER L. REv. 213 (2004); the fifth update is at 10 U. DENY. WATER L. REv. 391
(2007); the sixth update is at 13 U. DFNy. WATER L. REv. 389 (2009); the seventh update is at
14 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 159 (2010); the eighth update is at 16 U. DENY.WATER L. REv.

137 (2012).

2. Internal citations and fbotnotes have been omitted from all of the segnents of the
Court's opinions reproduced below.
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Reynolds v. Cotten, 274 P.3d 540, 546 (Colo. 2012).
In re Revised Abandonment List of Water Rights in Water Division 2
"Because Harrison neither proved historic use of the right for which he
sought a change nor was excep.ted from the requirement that he do so as a
precondition of changing its point of diversion; and because denying a change
of water right for failing to prove the historic use of the right does not amount
to an unconstitutional taking of property, the water court's dismissal of Harrison's application is aflirmed. Because, however, Harrison did not stipulate to
an order of abandonment as the consequence of failing to succeed in his
change application, but only as the consequence offaliling to timely file an application reflecting historic use, a condition with which he complied, tie water
court's order granting the Engineers' motion for abandonment is reversed."
In re Revised Abandonment List of Water Rights in Water Div. 2, 276
P.3d 571, 572-73 (Colo. 2012).
"Nor does the denial of a change of water right for faliling to prove historic
use unconstitutionally deprive an applicant of property without just comlpensation, in violation of either the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution or article II, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution. Although we have
characterized a water right, including the right to change its point of diversion,
as a property right, we have also made clear that the right in question is usuf'ructuary in nature, merely permitting the use of water within the limitations of
tie prior appropriation doctrine. The right itself is created by appropriating
unappropriated water and putting it to a beneficial use. As we have often
held, an absolute decree does not represent an adjudication of the lull measure of the right but is implicitly further limited in quantity by historic beneficial
consumptive use according to the decree. Limiting a change in water right to
the extent of established historic use, therefore, does not deprive an applicant
of an existing property right but rather ensures against an enlargement of that
right."
Id. at 574-75.
Archuleta v. Gomez (Archuleta ]I)
"We affirm the judgment of the water court in part, concluding that
Gomez adversely possessed Archuleta's legal interests in the Archuleta Ditch
and Manzanares Ditch No. 1. We reverse the water court's judgment in part,
ordering it to enter an injunction for reconstruction of Manzanares Ditch No.
2 and an easement across the northern part of Gomez's lower parcel to Archuleta's adjoining parcel, so that Archuleta will receive the flow of water his
legal interest in this ditch entitles him to divert."
Archuleta v. Gomez (ArchulelaI, 290 P.3d 482, 484 (Colo. 2012).
"Gomez held no decreed appropriation that entitled him to benefit from
the return flow resulting fron Archuleta's use of his legal interest in Manzanares Ditch No. 2. Nevertheless, according to Thompson's calculations,
Gomez increased his consumptive use of Manzanares Ditch No. 2 water by
3.7 acre-feet after he severed the ditch from its connection with Archuleta's
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adjoining property. Thompson testified that Manzanares Ditch No. 2 is so
short in length, and so close to the Huerfano River, that return flows from irrigation get back to the river within a very short tine. Because Archuleta neither abandoned his legal interest in Manzanares Ditch No. 2, nor did he cease
to have the benefit of it on his lands, Gomez's increased use of the waters
flowing in the ditch constituted an illegal enlargement of use of Manzanares
Ditch No. 2 water. As the evidence in the record demonstrates, Gomez did
not dispossess Archuleta of his legal interest in Manzanares Ditch No. 2. All
that Gomez accomplished by severing the ditch and increasing his use of ditch
water was to possess an amount of water that would otherwise have returned
to the Huerlano River, thence to the Arkansas River, as return flows from Archuleta's irrigation use.
Thus, the record demonstrates that Gomez committed two wrongful acts:
illegal enlargement of a water right and illegal destruction of a ditch."
IM.at 490.
"As to the Archuleta Ditch, the water court found that Gomez had increased his consumptive use by 8.9 acre-feet annually on his upper parcel,
above the amount of water available under his rights and to the exclusion of
Archuleta, by adversely possessing Archuleta's interest in the ditch, and this
use did not enlarge the historical beneficial use belonging to Archuleta's legal
interest in that ditch.
As to Manzanares Ditch No. 1, the water court found that Gomez had increased his consumptive use by 5.5 acre-feet annually on his lower parcel,
above the anount of water available under his rights and to the exclusion of
Archuleta, by adversely possessing Archuleta's legal interest in the ditch, and
this use did not enlarge the historical beneficial use belonging to Archuleta's
legal interest in that ditch.
Evidence in the record supports the water court's findings, and we uphold
them. We conclude that Gomez has adversely possessed Archuleta's legal interests in the Archuleta Ditch and Manzanares Ditch No. 1."
Id. at 488-89.
"Because Gomez wrongfully interfered with Archuleta's water and easement rights for Manzanares Ditch No. 2 and enlarged the use of that ditch's
water, we direct the water court to enter an injunction ordering Gomez to reconstruct the ditch, provide for an easement for the ditch across the northern
part of his forty-acre lower parcel to Archuleta's adjoining parcel, and cease
diverting any water that Archuleta's legal interest entitles Archuleta to divert to
his parcel. The injunction may include the terms the water court set forth Hi
its belated January 19, 2012, order and any additional terms appropriate to
prevent illegal enlargement and accomplish protection of Archuleta's legal interest in Manzanares Ditch No. 2."
Id. at 491.
Town of Minturn v. Tucker
"In regard to monthly limitations to be contained in the decrees, the stipulations provided for a consumptive use accounting 'based on the historical actual use of applicant.' Following the water court's entry of the original decrees,
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Minturn realized that several monthly consumptive use numbers in those decrees did not reflect the actual monthly historical use numbers attributable to
exercise of the town's water rights. Instead, they were derived from billing
statements provided by the Eagle River Water and Sanitation District that run
a month behind the actual month of use. Minturn petitioned the water court
to correct the decrees, using the actual use numbers by month of use. Of all
the Opposers, only Tucker opposed the decree corrections. After receiving
briefs and affidavits from both parties, the water court granted the petitions
and entered the corrected decrees.
Based upon the record in these proceedings, we uphold the corrected
findings of fact, conclusions of law, judgment, and decrees of the water court.
Section 37-92-304(10), C.R.S. (2012), grants the water court discretion within
a three-year period to correct substantive errors in a water decree. The parties' stipulations anticipated that actual monthly historical consumptive use
numbers would be utilized in the decrees' monthly limitations. The original
decrees mistakenly did not contain these numbers, contrary to the intent of
the parties. The water court did not abuse its discretion in entering the corrected decrees."
Town of Mintum v. Tucker, 293 P.3d 581, 584 (Colo. 2013).
"One of the essential Finctions of water rights proceedings is to prevent
injury to other water rights in operation of the judgment and decree. Central
to the water court's review of an augmentation plan is the express requirement
that augmentation plans must be non-injurious to vested water rights and that
they only be approved upon terms and conditions that prevent injury to those
rights. A classic form of injury involves diminution of the available water supply that a water rights holder would otherwise enjoy at the time and place and
in the amount of demand for beneficial use under the holder's decreed water
right operating in priority. Thus, the parties intended the 'no less restrictive'
provision to prevent injury to other water rights should the water court enter a
decree differing from the parties' stipulations. This provision effectively preserved Tucker's right to object to implementation of monthly maximums and
consumptive use factors that could have an injurious effect on any water rights
he held."
Id.at 595.
City and County of Denver v. City of Englewood
"Users of imported transmountain water enjoy greater rights of use and
reuse than do users of native water.... [Tihis Court has recognized transmountain water users 'rights to reuse and to make successive use of imported
transmountain water to the maximum extent feasible to 'minimize the amount
of water removed from Western Colorado.'
An appropriator who imports transmountain water need not have the intent to reuse or successively use that water at the time of the original appropriation to maintain the subsequent right of use. Rather, 'the right to reuse simultaneously and automatically attaches' upon the water importer's
appropriation of the relevant transmountain water. In sumn, then, 'the owner
of a water right which has been imported into a stream system has the right to
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successive reuse, to extinction, of the water.' Water users commonly use
transmountain water, and reusable transmountain effluent, as substitute water
supplies in exchanges."
City and Cnty. of Denver v. City of Englewood, 304 P.3d 1160, 1164 (Colo. 2013).
"lust like reusable transmountain efiluent, properly quantified LIRFs
(transnountain lawn irrigation return flows) are a legitimate source of substitute supply in an exchange because these two types of return flows are legally
indistinguishable. For example, the volume of water attributable to properly
quantified transmountain LIRFs originated in a foreign stream, in this case the
Colorado River, just like the volume of water that makes up reusable transmountain effluent. In addition, the foreign water comprising both reusable
effluent and transnmountain LIRFs was originally appropriated by a water user
for beneficial use-here, as substitute supply for exchanges on the South Platte
River. Finally, the importing water user acquires 'the right to successive reuse,
to extinction, of the Itransnountainl water' upon appropriation. Transmountain effluent and properly quantified transmountain LIRFs are two forms of
imported water that may be successively reused to extinction under this right.
As such, properly quantified transmountain LIRFs are legally indistinguishable
from reusable transmountain effluent.
Therelore, the water court correctly concluded that Denver's intent at the
time it appropriated the South Platte River water for exchange purposes in
1921... included the intent to use properly quantified transmountain LIRFs
attributable to the volume of the imported Colorado River water for substitute
supply purposes, just as it included the intent to use transmountain effluent
from Metro Sewer.*
Id. at 1165.
Cherokee Metropolitan District v. Felt Monson & Culichia LLC
"Cherokee Metropolitan District, a goverrurent body responsible for
providing water to its landowners and residents, is participating in the underlying litigation in order to minimize loss of its water rights in some of its wells.
In a separate legal malpractice action, Cherokee sued its former attorneys
James Felt and James Culichia, and their firm Felt, Monson & Culichia, LLC
(collectively "FMC") alleging that FM\C's negligence led to the loss of water
rights that is the subject of the underlying litigation. FMC sought to intervene
in the action pursuant to C.R.C.P. 24(a) and (b), arguing that intervention was
necessary in order to minimize damages it may suffer in the legal malpractice
case. The water court denied FMC's motion to intervene.
We find that, despite their adversity in the legal malpractice action, Cherokee and FMC share an identical interest in the underlying water rights litigation-namely, minimizing the loss of Cherokee's water rights. Because FMC
has not made a compelling showing that Cherokee may not adequately represent the interest that it shares with Cherokee, we affirm the water court's denial of FMC's motion to intervene as of right. Similarly, we dismiss FMC's appeal of the water court's denial of FMC's motion for permissive intervention
because the water court did not abuse its discretion.
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Cherokee Metro. Dist. v. Felt Monson & Culichia LLC, 304 P.3d 1167,
1168-69 (Colo. 2013).
"Because FMC has not made a compelling showing that Cherokee may
not adequately represent Cherokee and FMC's identical interest, we affirm
the water court's denial of its motion to intervene as of right. Similarly, we
dismiss FMC's appeal of the water court's denial of FMC's motion for pennissive intervention because the water court did not abuse its discretion."
Id.at 1174.
Raftopoulos Brothers v. Vermillion Ranch Limited Partnership
(Concerning Raftopoulos water right claims) "Here, the water court concluded that Raftopoulos met its burden to demonstrate a non-speculative intent to use the requested water for commercial and industrial purposes. The
water court reached this conclusion based on Mr. Raftopoulos' testimony that
two to four thousand wells 'may be developed in the area supplied by these
rights' and that such wells 'may need four to seven acre feet of development
water'; Mr. Raliopoulos' testimony that the partnership owns mineral rights in
Mollat County that 'may be developed in the future'; evidence of a contract to
supply water to Moffat County for dust suppression; and the contract with
Precision Excavating obtained in the month before trial. The water court further observed that the parties' water rights are the only water source for a thirty- to forty-mile radius; that water has been sold to the developers of existing
wells from the basin; that fracturing of gas wells is a technology available to
well owners in the vicinity; and that this basin is geographically well located to
meet the future demand for water.
This evidence does not, however, support a conclusion that Raftopoulos
denonstrated a non-speculative need for the water for industrial and commercial purposes. The mere fact that wells 'may be developed in the area' or
that the partnership owns mineral rights that 'may be developed in the future,'
without evidence of actual plans for such activities, does not demonstrate a
non-speculative intent to actually put the water to beneficial use. Moreover,
Raftopoulos provided no estimate of the quantity of water that might be needed for such activities."
Raftopoulos Bros. v. Vemillion Ranch Ltd. P'ship, 307 P.3d 1056, 1065
(Colo. 2013).
(Concerning Vermillion water right claims) "The record supports the water court's initial conclusion drawn from the evidence at trial. Vermillion presented no evidence in Case Nos. 08CW54 or 06CW61 regarding the technical feasibility of any of the reservoirs, no studies regarding the proposed
locations, no testimony regarding the ability to obtain necessary permitting,
and no estimates of the cost of construction or Vermillion' s ability to finance
such costs. Raftopoulos, on the other hand, presented expert testimony that
raised serious questions about the feasibility of the Sparks LA in light of the
conclusions in the Ingberg-Miller report regarding the soil conditions at that
location. In addition, Raftopoulos' expert testified that total design permitting
and construction costs for the Sparks IA could be between $1.5 and $2 million, not including the cost of land acquisition or the cost of addressing the soil
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conditions. This evidence raised serious doubts as to whether the project "can
and will" be completed with diligence and within a reasonable time. After
considering all of the evidence in both cases, the water court correctly concluded that Vermillion' s evidence of factors supporting the substantial probability of future completion of the project were not sufficient to outweigh tie
presence of contingencies identified by Raftopoulos."
Id. at 1070.
"We conclude that Vernillion failed to meet its burden to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence at trial that there is a substantial probability
that tie reservoirs necessary to effect the appropriation 'can and will' be cornpleted with diligence within a reasonable time. The 'substantial probability'
standard is employed to curb indefinite speculation, not to protect a conditional water right where only the thinnest possibility remains that the project
can and will be completed. Accordingly, we reverse the water court's grant of
a conditional water storage right for the Sparks Reservoir and the three alternate storage locations in Case No. 06CW61. In addition, we reverse the water
court's order in Case No. 08CW54 concluding that Vermillion has been reasonably diligent in developing its previously decreed conditional water storage
right in those reservoirs."
Id. at 1072.
Pawnee Well Users, Inc. v. Wolfe
"H.B. 1303 grants the State Engineer authority under section 37-90137(7)(c) of the Ground Water Act to 'adopt rules to assist with the administration of this subsection (7),' which pertains to 'caseIs] of dewateing of geologic fonnations by withdrawing nontributary ground water to facilitate or
pernit mining of minerals.' § 37-90-137(7). There is no dispute that H.B.
1303 authorizes the State Engineer to promulgate the Fruitland Rule. Indeed,
on its flace, the legislation applies to all areas of the state, and contains no exception for tribal or other lands within the state. The heart of the Plaintiffs'
challenge is that the Tribal Rule divests the State Engineer of that authority.
We disagree.
The Tribal Rule states that 'ItLIhese Rules and regulations shall not be construed to establish the jurisdiction of either the State of Colorado or tie
Southern Ute Indian Tribe over nontributary ground water within the boundaries of the Southern Ute Indian Reservation.' The water court, agreeing with
Plaintiffs, interpreted the Tribal Rule as recognizing that the State Engineer's
jurisdiction over nontributary ground water within the Reservation had not
been established. See Order at 22 (concluding that, because the Tribal Rule
does not establish such jurisdiction, 'the State engineer promulgated a rule in
an area where his jurisdiction was not established'). In other words, the water
court determined that the Tribal Rule somehow divested the State Engineer of
the jurisdiction which H.B. 1303 provided.
The Tribal Rule does not, mad indeed cannot, divest the State Engineer of
his authority as established in H.B. 1303. The Tribal Rule explicitly states
that the Final Rules do not 'establish' the State Engineer's jurisdiction. But
simply because the Final Rules do not establish the State Engineer's jurisdic-
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tion does not mean-as the water court believed-that jurisdiction was not established elsewhere. In this case, H.B. 1303 established jurisdiction. Moreover, the State Engineer cannot establish or disestablish his own jurisdiction.
As we have held, state agencies are creatures of statute and have 'only those
powers expressly conferred by the legislature.' The State Engineer possesses
the authority granted to him by H.B. 130 3-no more and no less. Indeed, the
State Engineer Maintained throughout the rulemaking process and these proceedings that H.B. 1303 granted him jurisdiction to delineate nontributary
ground water in the Fruitland Fornation through die Fruidand Rule. We
therefore conclude that die water court erred in invalidating the Fruitland Rule
based on the Tribal Rule."
Pawnee Well Users, Inc. v. Wolfe, 320 P.3d 320, 325-26 (Colo. 2013).
YellowJacket Water Conservancy District v. livingston
"Under section 37-45-114(l)(b) (of the Water Conservancy )istrict Act),
a director may remain in office beyond his term when no successor has been
appointed mad qualified: 'Each director shall hold office during the tern for
which he is appointed and until his successor is duly appointed and has qualilied....' Since our earliest days of statehood, we have held that as long as a
statute provides that the incumbent should hold over until his successor is dily qualified, the incumbent remains in office at the expiration of his term as a
de jure officer. The WCA provides, without limitation, that a director shall
hold office for the original term and for the interim period between the termination of the term and the appointment and qualification of a successor. The
legislature did not impose any additional temporal or reasonableness requirement regarding the length of a holdover term in this particular statute.
As such, we decline to read either limitation into the statute.
Therefore, under the WCA, the holdover directors serve as de jure otlicers and had the authority to act as Board members. Consequently, because
seven of the nine Yellow Jacket directors attended the September 29, 2009,
meeting, a majority of directors were present, meaning the Board assembled a
valid quorum. Therefore, the Board had authority to approve and file the diligence applications with the water court."
Yellow Jacket Water Conservancy Dist. v. Livingston, 318 P.3d 454, 457
(Colo. 2013).
Widefield Water and Sanitation District v. Witte
"The purpose of an HCU Ihistorical consumptive use] analysis in a
change proceeding is to detemine the 'amount of water available for use tinder the changed right.' As such, the analysis measures the anlount of water
lawfully used tinder the existing water right. But as our case law makes clear,
irrigation of lands not contemplated by the originally decreed appropriation is
unlawful absent a subsequent applicable decree .... 'An irrigation water right
cannot be lawfully enlarged for application to acreage beyond that for which
the appropriation is accomplished ... in the absence of an adjudicated priority for the enlargement.' 'An appropriator may not enlarge an appropriation,
even iThe enlauged use does not go beyond the decreed amiount, without es-
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tablishing all of the elements of an independent appropriation.' (emphasis
added)). Here, no valid decree for the Subject Water Rights features the Enlarged Acres. Thus, Applicants may not include these acres in their HCU
analysis.
In a change proceeding where the relevant decree for a water right expressly identifies the precise acres to be irrigated, we hold that an applicant
may only conduct an HCU analysis on acreage lawfully irrigated in accordance
with the decreed appropriation. Because no decree here authorizes irrigation
of the Enlarged Acres, Applicants must restrict their HCU analysis to the
Original Acres. Accordingly, we allinn the judgment of the water court and
remand the case to that court for proceedings consistent with this opinion."
Widefield Water and Sanitation Dist. v. Witte, 340 P.3d 1118, 1125 (Colo. 2014).
Wolfe v. Sedalia Water and Sanitation District
"Backed by multiple amnici briefs in its favor, Sedalia argues a polar opposite theory from that of the Engineers in this case. Fundamentally, the Engineers contend that the amount of historical beneficial consumptive use allocated to a water right under a change decree must be requantified each and
every time another change decree is sought. To the contrary, Sedalia and
amici argue that, once the historical beneficial consumptive use quantification
for the original appropriation has been made, it is fixed and carries through to
all future change cases, ad infinitum.
Neither of these propositions conforms to existing statutes and case law.
Resolution of the case now before us calls for no such cosmic pronouncement. Although the preclusion doctrines apply to water adjudications, their
application is not without reservation. The original priority date of an appropriation continues into the future under each change decree. But a changed
circumstance, such as an extended period of unjustified nonuse, calls for an
inquiry into whether the representative period of time used for calculating the
amount of consumptive use water available under the prior decree should remain the same for subsequent change applications.... Claim preclusion
serves an important role in the 'stability mad reliability of Colorado water
rights,' because it bars an objector opposing an augmentation plan from litigating historical usage claims that could have been brought when historical usage
was previously at issue and actually determined....
Every water right decree contains the implied condition of beneficial use.
Prolonged unjustified nonuse of a water right between entry of a prior change
decree and application for a successive change decree may constitute a
changed circumstance. The change process facilitates transfers of water rights
and allows continued application of the appropriated water to specified beneficial uses at identified locations, which may be different from those of the
current decree, and under conditions necessary to prevent injury to other water rights. A change proceeding confirms that a valid appropriation will continue in effect under provisions that differ from those contained in the prior
decree.
Prolonged unjustified nonuse calls into question the appropriate repre-
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sentative period of time for calculating the annual average consumptive use
amount and therefore, tfie anount legally available for the subsequent change
decree. The water court erred by invoking issue preclusion against inquiry into the alleged nonuse of the water right after entry of the 1986 change decree
and by allowing only an abandonment claim."
Wolfe v. Sedalia Water and Sanitation Dist., 343 P.3d 16, 26-28 (Colo.
2015).
Wolfe v. Jim Hutton Educational Foundation
"Because the Engineers proved that over ten years of nonuse of the decreed diversion point had passed, the Engineers did not need to prove more
to trigger the presumption that Hutton had abandoned the water right. The
burden then shifted to the water right holder, the Foundation, to demonstrate
a fact or condition excusing such nonuse or a lack of intent to abandon.
To be sure, our holding adds a step in the analysis. But the second step
necessarily resolves an important question of burden-shifting and public
policy. Once the Engineers establish nonuse of the decreed diversion point,
the burden shifts to the water right holder to show use to rebut the
presumption of abandonment. At that point, tie water right holder stands in
the better position to provide evidence of use and intent. The onus should be
on a water right holder who is using an undecreed point of diversion to rebut a
presumption of abandonment. Thus, we conclude that the water court erred
in holding that the Engineers did not establish the statutory presumption of
abandonment for the Tip Jack water right."
Wolfe v. Jim Hutton Educ. Found., 344 P.3d. 855, 860 (Colo. 2015).
"We hold that when the Engineers prove that the water right holder has
not used the decreed point of diversion for ten years or more, the Engineers
trigger the rebuttable presumption of abandonment under section 37-92402(11). Once triggered, the burden shifts to the water right holder to
demonstrate a lack of intent to abandon. Because the water court erroneously
believed that proof of nonuse at the decreed point of diversion was insufficient
to raise the presumption, it failed to require evidence excusing such noiuse in
order to rebut the presumption."
Id. at 862.
Farmers Water Development Co. v. Colorado Water Conservation Board
"We begin with the fact that the legislature vested the CWCB with exclusive authority to appropriate instrean flows 'on behalf of the people of the
state of Colorado.' S 37-92-102(3). We have consistently recognized that the
CWCB acts to protect the environment on behalf of the public... CWCB is
'the mechanism to address state appropriation of water for the good of the
public'... CWCB 'acts on behalf of the people of the state of Colorado and
is thereby burdened with a fiduciary duty arising out of its unique statutory responsibilities' ... recognizing that in giving the CWCB exclusive authority to
appropriate minimum instreani flows on behalf of the public, the legislature
prohibited the judiciary from decreeing instrean flow rights to a private par-

WA TER LA W RE VIEW

Volume 18

ty.... Thus, to the extent that any rights are at issue in the CWCB proceeding, it is the public's interest in the preservation of the environment.
Moreover, the purpose of the CWCB's ISF proceedings is to establish
whether a water appropriation by the CWCB would preserve, 'to a reasonable
degree,' the existing natural environment without injury to existing water
rights. § 37-92-10 2 (3)(c). This is a policy detennination within the discretion
of the CWCB. For example, in rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of
the legislative delegation of power to the CWCB, we described the nature of
the CWCB process. Specifically, we stated that 'Itihe legislative objective is to
preserve reasonable portions of the natural environment in Colorado,' and
that the legislature empowered the CWCB, an agency 'having specific expertise regarding the preservation of flora, fauna and other aspects of the natural
environment,' to pursue that policy objective through appropriation of instream flows ... the 'policy of protecting the natural and man-made environment' is addressed through the 'statutory mechanism' of the CWCB's appropriation of instream flows.., the CWCB is 'a unique entity charged with
preserving the natural environment to a reasonable degree for the people of
the State of Colorado'. Thus, the appropriation of instream flows in order to
protect the natural environment is a policy determination delegated to the
CWCB. Indeed, the purpose of the CWCB's notice, comment, and hearing
process is to gather input from the public regarding this policy determination.
Furthermore, the CWCB's determination that a particular ISF will preserve the environment to a reasonable degree is a prospective policy detemination... section 37-92-102(3) bestows a unique fiduciary obligation upon
the CWCB on behalf of the people of Colorado to preserve the environment
on an ongoing basis. Thus, 'it applies generally applicable policy going forward,' which we have recognized as a hallmark of prospective policy determinations."
Farmers Water Dev. Co. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 346 P.3d.'52,
58-59 (2015).
"In short, because instream flows are junior water rights which cannot
place a call on senior rights, we find Farmers' argument regarding injury to
other water rights unconvincing. At bottom, the focus of the CWCB's instream flow appropriation is not on the rights of identifiable individuals or entities, but instead on the furtherance of a policy of preserving the natural environment for the people of Colorado. We conclude it is quasi-legislative in
nature, and therefore alfirm the water court's decision."
Id. at 61.
McKenna v. Witte
"We must determine whether the water court's judgment of abandonment
was proper. The Applicants contend that the judgment was improper because
the Division Engineer missed the statutory deadline to prepare the abandonmient list by several days, which they claim divested the water court of jurisdiction. We hold that the deadline to prepare the abandonment list under section 37-92-401(1)(a), C.R.S. (2014), is directional and is not a jurisdictional
mandate. Thus, the Division Engineer's failure to prepare the abandonment
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list by the statutory deadline did not divest the water court of jurisdiction over
the case. Further, we decline to overturn the water court's detennination of
abandonment because the record supports the conclusion that the Applicants
intended to permanently discontinue their use of the Sanchez Ditch water
rights."
McKenna v. Witte, 346 P.3d 35, 37 (2015).
"The court found the 'prevaricated receipt and the choreographed photos' of the 2003 diversion insullicient to overcome the presumlption. Instead,
the court found that the pictures were staged to avoid abandonment. The
court found no evidence of actual repairs to the ditch, no attempt to legally
change the point of diversion, and no in-priority calls for water until 2013.
Moreover, although McKenna participated in some local water-court matters,
he never did so to protect his Sanchez Ditch water rights. Accordingly, the
water court determined, from the totality of the circumstances, that McKenna
(lid not prove any actual, beneficial use of his Sanchez Ditch water rights, nor
(lid he present any acceptable justification for the extended period of nonuse.
In so doing, the court concluded that McKenna's decision to spend his resources developing wells showed that.he did not find the Sanchez l)itch worth
the required repairs. Thus, the water court ordered that McKenna's Sanchez
Ditch water rights be decreed abandoned."
Id. at 39.
"It is the province of the water court to weigh the evidence and measure
the credibility of wimtnesses, and we will not disturb its resolution of factual issues on appeal. In this case, the record supports the trial court's finding that
McKenna abandoned his Sanchez Ditch water rights. He never made a legitimate effort to apply the water to beneficial use and could not prove that he
ever intended to do so. Consequently, we must sustain the water court's finding of abandonment."
Id. at 44.
East Cherry Creek Valley Water and Sanitation District v. Wolfe
"A chanige of water right application is considered to be a complaint under C.R.C.P. 15, and a statement of opposition is considered to be a responsive pleading. Colo. Unif. Water Ct. R. 4(a). Correspondingly, the "claim" in
a change of water right application is the aggregate of operative facts that give
rise to the right to a change decree.
A water right owner may apply to change the type of use, location of use,
time of use, and/or point of diversion of a water right. The change of water
right must be adjudicated into a change decree, and its issuance is subject to a
two-step factual inquiry into: (1) the scope, measure, and limit of the water
right proposed to be changed and (2) the conditions necessary to protect
against injury to other decreed water rights.
First, the right to a decree changing the usufructuary right is limited in
quantity and time by the appropriator's actual historical beneficial use. Quantification of the amount of water beneficially consumed guards against rewarding wasteful practices or recognizing water claims that the nature and extent of
the appropriator's need do not justify. Indeed, actual application of the water
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to the appropriator's beneficial use becomes the basis, measure, and limit of
the right. An applicant must be able to show the legal extent of its water right
interest before it can be changed to ensure that no injury occurs in the process.
The second part of the water court's inquiry concerns the decree conditions necessary to ensure that the change will not injuriously affect other decreed water rights. Thus, a change decree contains conditions that differ from
those contained in the prior decree. This two-step examination facilitates
transfers of water rights, allows continued application of the appropriated water to specified beneficial uses at identified locations, mad ensures that a valid
appropriation will continue in effect under provisions in the change decreewhile maintaining return flow patterns, alleviating material injury to other water rights, and preventing enlargement of the water right."
E. Cherry Creek Valley Water and Sanitation Dist. v. Wolfe, 348
P.31 434, 440-41 (2015).
"In conclusion, factual issues remain to be resolved by the water court in
this case, including how much water is available for use for purposes of the
change of water right and the terms and conditions necessary to prevent injury
to other decreed water rights, belore the water court may enter a final judgment and decree for purposes of appeal.
Because there is no final judgment on a claim for relief within the purview
of Rule 54(b), we are without jurisdiction to entertain this appeal."
Id.at 443.
Frees v. Tidd
"(W)e determine that the Tidds properly obtained a court declaration and
decree of no material injury before making alterations to a ditch easement located on their property. To apply the water decreed for their hydropower
use, the Tidds must first make several alterations to the ditch. In 1?oaring
Fork Club, L.P. v. S..Jude's Co., we held that the owner of property burdened by a ditch easement has no right to alter an easement without the consent of the benefitted owner unless he or she first obtains a declaration by a
court that such alterations will cause no damage to the benefitted owner. The
Frees own an easement across the Tidds' property for the ditch, and therefore
the Tidds were required to show that their proposed alterations to the ditch
would not injure the Frees' vested property rights. Here, the water court
made a factual finding that the terms mad conditions of the decree are sufficient to mitigate any injury to the Frees' water right and right-of-way property
interests, and the water court retained continuing juisdiction for reconsideration of the question of injury to the Frees' water and ditch rights. The water
court's findings of fact are supported by the record. Accordingly, the Tidds
complied with our directions in S Jude's to obtain a declaration of the court
before altering the rights associated with the ditch easement located on their
property."
Frees v. Tidd, 2015 CO 39, 17, __ P.3d - (2015).
"(T)he Frees .do not own the physical water they divert through the
Garner Creek Ditch No. 1 headgate; instead they own the right to beneficially
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use the water for irrigation. The fact that the sane physical water owned by
tie public and diverted from Garner Creek will be put to an additional use
Under a separate water right before reaching the Frees' place of beneficial use
in no way depnived the water court of authority to issue the conditional water
right decree with a 2010 priority in this case. The Frees overlook the fact that
the General Assembly has provided that tie public's water resource becomes
'available' to an adjudicated water right either because there is unappropriated
water available in a stream that is not over-appropriated or, when the alliected
strean is over-appropriated, tie decree for tie junior water right contains
sufficient conditions to prevent injury to other adjudicated water rights."
Id. 123.
"Small-scale hydropower projects benefit the public because they ofler an
alternative source of energy that has generally minimal enviromnental impacts,
diverts less water, is less susceptible to blackout and damnage as a result of
storms, and does not require the creation of damns or reservoirs because they
rely on existing infrastructure. In granting the Tidds' non-consumptive conditional water right application, the water court followed Colorado law allowing
the public's scarce water resource to be put to multiple beneficial uses while
protecting decreed senior water rights."
Id.130.

